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In Q1 2016, infl a on slowed down both month-on-month and year-on-year, driven by further decline in internal demand amid a strengthening rouble, as well as due to the high base eff ect a year earlier. However, expecta ons for high infl a on are s ll strong, which will stem decline in price growth rates in the mid-run. 1 In Q1 2016, infl a on slowed down from 1% as of January month-end to 0.6% in February and to 0.5% in March. The annualized consumer price growth rate (over the same period of 2015) fell from 9.8% in January to 7.3% in March 2016 (Fig. 1) . The annual growth rate of consumer prices slowed down rapidly largely due to the high base eff ect. The decline in consumer price growth rates in the Russian economy was primarily determined by a decline in internal demand and hence by companies' eff orts to minimize their costs. For instance, nega ve growth rates of the producer price index have been observed since November 2015, and they reached -1.3% in January and -1.5% in February 2016.
In January-March, food price growth rates were down from 1.3% in January to 0.7% in February and to 0.3% in March. Agricultural produce, eggs and sugar saw most of the decline. Note that infl a on for this product group was driven down primarily by the rouble exchange rate that strengthened in February-March 2016. The product group 'red meat and poultry meat' has been facing defl a on since October 2015 amid falling demand for meat and with consumers' refocusing on cheaper poultry meat.
In January-March 2016, food price growth rates remained high, increasing by 0.8% in March 2016. However, the rouble's apprecia on was followed by considerably slower growth rates in prices of goods that are most sensi ve to exchange rate trends, including electric and other household appliances, audio visual goods, as well as medicaments.
In January-March 2016, growth rates of prices and tariff s of paid services to individuals dropped for all the categories of services: from 1% to 0.3% in February and 0.1% in March. The dynamics of prices of outbound tourism services (down by 2.7% in March 2016) contributed most to the decline, due to a strengthening rouble. Source: Rosstat.
Fig. 1. CPI growth rate in 2011-2016 (% change, year-over-year)
Infl a on stopped declining in April: the Consumer Price Index (CPI) reached 0.4% within the fi rst 18 days of April. CPI stood at 0.5% in April 2015. In other words, the annualized infl a on rate may cease slowing down in April.
According to the es mates released by Russia's central bank, in March 2016 the median one-year ahead expected infl a on rate stood at 14.7%, down by 1 p.p. from the value seen in February. The expected infl a on rate reached its peak value of 16.7% in January. However, expecta ons for high infl a on are s ll strong.
With price growth rates slowing down in Russia earlier in 2016, some experts have made an assump on that defl a on may be an cipated. In parcular, Bank of America analyst David Honer 1 believes that Russia is threatened by being caught in a defl a on trap in the long term, and this will be facilitated by cuts on state budget expenditure, current account surplus and a strengthening rouble. Sociologists also note that individuals have changed their consumer behaviour 2 that tends to limit their spending amid a challenging macroeconomic context. All the above-listed factors do deter consumer demand and growth of prices of imported goods, that is, they slow down infl a on growth rates.
In fact, defl a on is not an exo c phenomenon at all. Price defl a on was seen in both developed countries (Japan in 1993 -2015 , Ireland in 2010 -2011 and emerging economies (China in 1998 -1999 , Lithuania in 2002 -2003 . While prices may fall for many reasons, there are two types of defl a on that can be dis nguished. The fi rst one can be seen in advanced economies with an extremely low aggregate demand as a result of collapse of overheated fi nancial markets, in which case a defl a on spiral may occur: falling prices lead to higher unemployment rates that in turn entail a new decline in aggregate demand and bring an extra downward pressure on prices. Japan is a classic illustra on of a defl a on crisis in progress: since the mid 1990s Japan has been struggling to get out of the defl a on trap. The current condi ons in the Russian economy could not lead to this type of defl a on. The second type of defl a on is typical of emerging markets with a fi xed exchange rate regime. The money supply and infl a on processes in such countries tend to be extremely reliant on capital fl ows and trade balance. With a fi xed exchange rate, capital ou lows and net export cuts tend to force the money supply to shrink and prices to grow (Argen na in the mid 1990s). It is unlikely that Russia will face this type of defl a on, because the rouble exchange rate is nearly free-fl oa ng.
Russia may The defl a on in Chile may be of interest for, because it occurred in the macroeconomic context similar to that in Russia. Chile's CPI dropped by 1.5% in 2009. That episode is dis nguished by the fact that, fi rst, Chile's central bank adhered to an infl a on targe ng policy, including a free fl oa ng exchange rate; second, prices of exported resource-based commodi es plummeted in [2008] [2009] , that accounted for about 50% of Chile's total exports; third, capital infl ows gave way to capital ou lows at that period. Under these circumstances, Chile's trade balance fell, na onal currency depreciated and GDP declined. In an eff ort to deter the plunging exchange rate and infl a on, Chile's central bank li ed the key rate up to 8.25% in the second half of 2008, whereupon the na onal currency began to fi rm up. With rapid slowdown of infl a on and the economic downturn of 2009, Chile's monetary authori es lowered gradually the key rate to 0.5% earlier in 2010, and the money stock shrank by 5%. The example shows that defl a on may occur under condi ons similar to those in Russia, and a plausible reason for this may be rapid diminu on in demand amid ght monetary policy condi ons.
However, the money stock growth rates in Russia have not been below 4% since the start of 2010, and now they are about 10% (Fig. 2) . The internaonal prac ce shows that the money stock growth per se cannot guarantee a posi ve infl a on, because defl a on may just as well be a ended with growth in the money supply (Argen na in 1999 -2000 , Israel, Bulgaria in 2013 -2014 , Vietnam in 1996 -2000 . However, defl a on used to follow a dras c slump in the money supply growth rates. Therefore, if the М2 growth rates are maintained at the current level, defl a on is unlikely to occur. The money supply can shrink only if the Bank of Russia maintains high interest rates for too long, leaving them intact amid slowing down price growth rates. 
